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ETERNITY, AWARENESS, AND ACTION
Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann

Our article "Eternity" (1981), in which we presented, defended, and applied
the traditional doctrine of divine eternity, prompted some criticisms that focus
on difficulties in the concept of eternity itself. In the present article we
summarize our original account of the doctrine before offering versions of
two such criticisms and replying to them. Our replies are intended to clarify
and develop further the essential notions of eternity's atemporal duration and
of its relationship with time.

1. Introduction
In an earlier article I we presented, defended, and applied the traditional
doctrine of divine eternity, the doctrine that God's mode of existence is
timeless, characterized essentially by "the complete possession all at once of
illimitable life. "2 We argued that the traditional conception of God as the
absolutely perfect being entails eternity as his mode of existence. No life that
is imperfect in its being possessed with the radical incompleteness entailed
by temporal existence could be the mode of existence of all absolutely perfect
being. The necessarily beginningless, endless life of a perfect being must also
be possessed perfectly. That means that it must be devoid of any past, which
is no longer possessed, and of any future, which is not yet possessed. The
existence of an absolutely perfect being must be an indivisibly persistent
present actuality.
Our article prompted some criticisms that attacked the concept of eternity
directly, by focusing on difficulties in the notion of atemporal duration, which
we take to be at the heart of the concept,3 or on difficulties in the relationship
between eternity and time, a relationship presupposed by all traditional theological applications of the doctrine. Some of those criticisms have already
been satisfactorily addressed in the literature, but there are others that strike
us as particularly important and requiring further clarification of the doctrine
or modifications in our presentation of it."
After briefly summarizing the doctrine of eternity as we originally presented it, we introduce versions of each of these two sorts of objections
and reply to them. In doing so we hope to clarify and extend our original
account.
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2. Eternity Summarized
The ancient and medieval philosophers who first argued for eternity understood it as the mode of existence requisite for whatever they considered to
be the foundation of temporal existence-for being as contrasted with becoming, or for the absolutely perfect being as contrasted with the various and
necessarily imperfect manifestations of perfect being in material, temporal
being. With the possible exception of Parmenides, no ancient or medieval
philosopher who accepted eternity as a real, atemporal mode of existence
meant thereby to deny the reality of time or to suggest that all temporal
experiences are illusory. In introducing or drawing on the concept of eternity,
they treated eternity and time as two separate modes of real existence. Eternity is a mode of existence that is on their view neither reducible to time nor
incompatible with the reality of temporal existence. The resultant concept of
eternity, especially as developed by such Christian philosophers as Augustine,
Boethius, Anselm, and Aquinas, has four ingredients: life, illimitability, duration, and timelessness. s The combination of these ingredients obviously
gives rise to difficulties, some of which we discussed in "Eternity."

The Extension and Timelessness of Eternity
3. The Terminology of Duration and Timelessness
As we've already said, the most flagrant of the difficulties arises from the
combination of duration and timelessness. Of course, if the duration implicit
in the definition of eternity counts as persistence through time, the ordinary
meaning of 'duration,' then the combination of duration with timelessness is
incoherent. But, as we explained in our 1981 artic1e,6 the philosophers who
developed the concept of eternity were led to use familiar terms in unfamiliar
ways in trying to express the novel notion of a life possessed completely all
at once. 7 In particular, 'duration,' familiar only in its temporal application,
can be seen as applicable even more aptly to that atemporal mode of existence; for biological life, or any other sort of temporal duration, is characterized by a peculiar non-durational evanescence. Our past is already lost to us,
our future is not yet accessible, and even a little consideration of our present,
the time at which we actually exist, shows it to be a duration less instant, the
unextended boundary between our past and our future. No life that is imperfect in being necessarily possessed with such radical incompleteness could
be the mode of existence for an absolutely perfect being. The necessarily
beginningless, endless life of an absolutely perfect being must be perfectly
possessed and thus devoid of past and future; it must consist in an indivisibly
persistent present actuality.
An insistence on interpreting 'duration,' 'persistent,' 'life,' and 'present' in
their ordinary temporal senses would effortlessly render the concept of eter-
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nity incoherent. But technical uses of familiar terms are common and go
unprotested in other theoretical disciplines. The sciences, for example, regularly employ ordinary words analogically to illuminate peculiar features of
reality. And, of course, no one would suppose that it was a good argument
against the possibility of black holes to point out that they couldn't literally
be holes, or against the big bang theory to point out that the first physical
event in the history of our universe couldn't literally have made any noise.
Nor, on the other hand, would any informed person deny that there were
aspects of the real nature of black holes or the big bang that rendered those
designations more informative than others might have been. 8 Showing that
the concept of eternity is really incoherent, then, would require showing that
the notion medieval philosophers were trying to capture with their technical
terminology is incoherent even when we allow their unfamiliar uses of terms
such as 'duration' and 'present.'

4. Fitzgerald's Criticism
One way of trying to show that the concept of timeless duration is really
incoherent depends on developing a second difficulty stemming from the
definition of eternity, one that goes beyond the terminological novelties to
focus on the combination of timelessness and illimitability. An illimitable
mode of existence is evidently an infinitely extended mode of existence.
Since it seems that any extension can be divided, at least conceptually, it
seems that the illimitability that characterizes eternity must entail conceptual
divisibility. But if in virtue of being illimitable eternity is divisible, it shows
signs of collapsing into sempiternity: beginningless, endless time. Some of
the conceptually produced divisions of eternity would be before others of
them, thus introducing succession into eternity. But since timelessness rules
out succession, the combination of illimitability and timelessness makes eternity look as if it is characterized essentially both by succession and by the
absence of succession.
This charge of more than superficial incoherence was forcefully raised in
a recent article by Paul Fitzgerald. 9 Anything that counts as extension, he
says, is ordinarily expected to meet three conditions: (l) "two distinct particulars can both have the kind of extension in question"; (2) in every extension there must be extended "subphases" having that same mode of extension;
and (3) "by having different positions along the extensive dimension in question two qualitatively identical particulars can be numerically distinct. "10 If
eternity fails to meet these conditions, Fitzgerald says, one wants to know
why, and whether in that case eternal duration still counts as an extended
mode of existence. If, on the other hand, eternity meets these conditions, one
wants to know how eternity counts as timeless-i.e., successionless.
Fitzgerald supposed that we would choose the second horn of this dilemma,
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and that we would prevent eternity from collapsing into time by denying to
it the possibility of succession. He thought we could accomplish that only by
removing extension from eternal duration and reducing it to a point, thereby
effectively abandoning the idea of atemporal duration.

5. Reply to Fitzgerald
In an earlier reply to Fitzgerald II we argued that denying succession to eternity would collapse eternity to a point only in case all extension includes
some sort of succession. But whether or not that is the case is just the point
at issue between Fitzgerald and defenders of the doctrine of eternity, and so
in assuming that the denial of succession is a denial of an extended mode of
existence Fitzgerald begs the question. 12 And in fact we do not choose the
second horn of Fitzgerald's dilemma, as he supposed we would, but rather
the first: we deny that eternity meets the conditions for extension laid down
by Fitzgerald. Underlying those conditions is his assumption that anything
that can count as extended must be divisible; from his point of view something is either extended and thus divisible, or indivisible and thus unextended.
And so he sees the doctrine of eternity as incoherent because it claims of the
same mode of existence that it is both extended and indivisible. 13
Our acceptance of the tradition that uses 'extended' in describing the
atemporal mode of existence undoubtedly lends intuitive force to Fitzgerald's
argument. If 'persistent' or any other reasonable alternative that occurred to
us had seemed clearly less open to misinterpretation, we would have discarded 'extended' in its favor. But, we argued in replying to Fitzgerald, his
three conditions for extension are generalizations arrived at by considering
samples of extension that are all temporal or spatial. Given the provenance
of his conditions, it is not surprising that they will not apply to what is neither
spatial nor temporal. That all extensions of time or space are at least potentially or conceptually divisible is generally undisputed,14 but nothing in that
fact" we argued, provides good grounds for inferring that what is atemporally
extended must also be divisible. On the doctrine of eternity, the eternal present persists, encompasses time, and is unbounded. In those respects it resembles temporal duration enough to make it helpful to speak of eternity as
extended, in something like the way it is helpful to speak of a collapsed star
as a hole. On the other hand, because it lacks succession, it fails to resemble
spatial and temporal extensions in being divisible. And to conclude on the
basis of the characteristics it does share with temporal duration that it must
also be like it in all other respects is like thinking that a collapsed star must
be an opening in space because it is in some respects appropriately characterized as a hole.
In our view, these considerations reveal serious shortcomings in
Fitzgerald's attempt to show that the doctrine of eternity is incoherent. But

ETERNITY, A WARENESS, AND ACTION

467

we have also come to think that we did not do enough to answer the question
implicit in the first horn of Fitzgerald's dilemma: If, as we claim, eternity
does not meet his conditions for extension, then in what sense can we say
that it is extended? We return to this question below.

6. Nelson:S Criticism
In Tillie and Eternityl5 Brian Leftow replies to several objections against the
concept of eternity in ways that strike us as entirely adequate. But there is
one sort of objection, similar to the one Fitzgerald raised, that Leftow seems
disposed to concede in a version developed by Herbert Nelson:
... the conditions definitive of atemporal duration seem mutually inconsistent.
On the one hand, as enduring and therefore ... really and indeed infinitely
extended, the atemporally enduring entity must have stages which really lie
outside one another in some sense, and thus not be all at once .... On the other
hand, as atelllporal and therefore . . .really existing all at once ... , no real constituent [of it] can be absent when any other is present. Thus at every moment
of the infinite duration of the atemporally enduring entity every other momentand there must be infinitely many eternal moments-must be present as well. To
have atemporality, the genuine differentiation of parts or stages required for
real extension must be suppressed. To have duration, the absence of differentiated parts or stages required for atemporality must be suppressed. 16

The core of this objection is virtually the same as Fitzgerald's. But Nelson's
criticism is distinguished by his supposition that in attributing duration and
presentness to God we are presupposing some genus common to God and creatures since temporal entities are also said to have duration and presentness.
Nelson sees this as a "commitment to univocity" on our part,17 and he protests that predicates are not to be attributed to God and creatures univocally.
The crucial claim in Nelson's argument, as in Fitzgerald's, is that extended
eternity essentially involves a plurality and thus must be divisible: "to say
that atemporal duration is infinitely extended entails that in it an infinite
number of different positions can be designated." We might avoid divisibility,
he suggests, but only by falling into another well-known sort of difficulty
regarding discourse about God-only, that is, in case "there is some radical
equivocation lurking in the use of 'extension' and defeating the whole point
of their insistence on the fundamental importance of including extended
atemporal duration in the concept of eternity. "18

7. Reply to Nelson
Predicating the same characteristics of God and creatures, however, does not
entail predicating them univocally, thus presupposing a genus common to
God and creatures. If it did, Nelson himself could be accused of the very
mistake he attributes to us, because he predicates knowledge, freedom, and
causation of God.I'l But, of course, it has long been maintained in the tradition
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of Christian philosophical theology that no such entailment holds. So
Aquinas, for example, attributes to God not only knowledge and freedom (as
Nelson does), duration and presentness (as we do), but also goodness, justice,
and love, without supposing that he is thereby in conflict with his own argued
position that no characteristic can be predicated univocally of God and creatures. Instead, he maintains that although God's knowledge, duration, or
goodness are not identical with those characteristics among creatures, there
is likeness enough to warrant using those ordinary terms of God (with the
proper caveats against interpreting them univocally).
On the other hand, the fact that we deny divisibility to atemporal duration
does not mean that we are predicating duration equivocally of God and
creatures. To begin with, we are inclined to doubt even Nelson's assumption
that every instance of duration in lillie is divisible. Consider the specious
present-for example, the specious present during which a mother hears her
son yell for help as he flies off his skateboard. The specious present is
different from the metaphysical temporal present in being extended. It takes
time, however little, for the mother to apprehend and process the various
sounds that constitute the utterance 'help,' identify the utterance as her son's,
and understand it. That time is of course conceptually divisible, but only into
parts of that time, not into parts of the mother's specious present, which is
characterized by her hearing her son yell for help. She may pick up theoretically distinguishable component sounds in conceptually divisible parts of
the time underlying her specious present, but in none of those parts does she
hear her son yell for help. Nor does she successively acquire each individual
sound, remember it, and then integrate her short-term memories to produce
in herself the experience of hearing 'help.' Reflections on the ludicrousness
of such an account contributed to the original introduction of the notion of a
specious present. 20 The specious present, then, seems to be an instance of
something that is both extended and conceptually indivisible as such. 21 It is
also a particularly apposite instance since, as William Alston has suggested,
it is illuminating to think of the eternal present as God's specious present,
which covers all of time. 22 A temporal being might naturally be inclined to
impose on such a universally overarching specious present the divisions appropriate to time, but imposed temporal divisions are as inapplicable to the
eternal present as they would be to the mother's specious present.
But even if, for the sake of the argument, we grant Nelson his assumption
that everything temporal and extended is divisible, it doesn't follow that we
are using the terms 'duration' or 'extension' equivocally of God and creatures.
Nelson's criticism can be seen as presenting us with an apparent dilemma. If
God is absolutely simple or transcendent, as traditional Christian theology
claims, then many terms cannot be predicated univocally of God and creatures. On the other hand, only a radically agnostic theism would maintain
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that terms ordinarily predicated of creatures can be predicated of God only
equivocally. But this dilemma is only apparent. Analogical predication is the
traditionally recognized way between its horns. 23
Knowledge, for example, is commonly said to be predicated of God and
creatures analogically, not univocally or equivocally. But precisely which
features of creaturely knowledge are features of divine knowledge too, and
precisely what in God takes the place of features of creaturely knowledge
that are obviously inappropriate to him-these are things we could say only
in case we could comprehend God's sort of knowledge better than we can,
in which case we would of course be able to explain more of it in univocal
terms. Where univocal accounts are theoretically unavailable and equivocal
predication is worse than worthless, we may be said to be in circumstances
of irreducibly analogical predication. Similarly, in seeking those features of
eternal extension (or duration, or presentness) that take the place of the
analogous temporal features, in seeking even a list of all the features shared
by temporal and atemporal duration, etc., critics of the concept of eternity
are seeking what cannot be found if, as we maintain, this, too, is a case of
irreducibly analogical predication.
Still, none of this is to say that human beings cannot develop an intelligible
account of God's nature or mode of existence. On the basis of analogical
predication we can say, for example, that essentially illimitable eternal duration, like conceivably unbounded temporal duration, is a measure of existence, indicating some degree of permanence of some sort on the part of
something that persists-although, of course, divine existence, permanence,
and persistence will be analogous to, not identical with, temporal existence,
permanence, and duration. Acknowledging the impossibility of predicating
certain terms univocally of God and creatures does not, as Nelson suggests
it does, drive us into using them equivocally. Analogical predication remains
available, and, here as elsewhere in subject matter that lies beyond experience, it leaves open a way along which understanding can be developed.

Relationships Between Eternity and Time

8. Time and Eternity Compared with Nelson s Alpha and Beta
Analogical predication may be the fundamenta' use of analogy in philosophy,
but it is by no means the only one. Explanatory analogies seem indispensable,
and they range from suggestive similes through arguments to full theories. 24
Somewhere in that range are philosophical stories, for which Plato's myth of
the cave is an apt paradigm. Philosophical stories are employed not as mere
illustrations but as means of reducing the strangeness in analogical predication by providing imaginable access to concepts that are not obviously instantiated in ordinary experience.
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Nelson's rejection of the concept of atemporal duration rests heavily on a
philosophical story, which is also intended to challenge our account of the
relationship between time and eternity. "Suppose that, in addition to the
physical universe which we inhabit [Alpha], there exists another physical
universe [Beta] not physically, spatially, or temporally related to our own .
.. . No thing or event in Alpha exists or occurs before or after or at the same
time as any thing or event in Beta. No thing or event in Beta is in the past
or the future or the present of any thing or event in Alpha .... There is no now
common to Alpha and Beta. "25
Nelson intends his story of Alpha and Beta to shed some light on the
relationship between eternity and time as we presented it. 26 Like Nelson's
Alpha and Beta, temporal creatures and eternal God have no connections that
could be univocally described as spatial or as temporal; but unlike Alpha and
Beta, creatures and God are not totally disconnected.
As Nelson would of course agree, a total separation between God and
creatures would be incompatible with many religious beliefs and practices.
Consider petitionary prayer. Suppose that one person in Beta-call her
'Venus' -had the role of God for some person in Alpha-call him' Aeneas';
and suppose that today Aeneas prays to Venus for calm seas tomorrow. Given
the total disconnection of these two worlds, it isn't clear that Venus can know
what Aeneas is asking or bring about events in Alpha. But suppose, for the
sake of argument, that causal and cognitive relationships between these disconnected worlds are somehow possible. So suppose Venus can somehow
know that Aeneas prays at tI, and can somehow efficaciously will calm seas
in Alpha at t2. What Venus cannot do, even on this generous supposition, is
hear Aeneas's prayer, be with him in his anxiety, or be related to him in any
way that counts as or is presupposed in direct awareness. Such acts or relationships require some sort of simultaneity between Alpha and Beta and so
would violate Nelson's stipulations regarding them. On our generous supposition Venus could, of course, cause Aeneas to believe that she had heard his
prayer or that she was with him; but those beliefs induced in him would be
false. Nelson's story does not present our notion of atemporal duration or of
the relationship between eternity and time.

9. The Story of Aleph
Still, Nelson is on the right track in thinking that telling a story is the most
efficient way in which to try to get some idea of God's mode of existence
without using ordinary terms either univocally or equivocally. Human beings'
attempts at this sort of thing are attempts to think themselves up the ladder
of being, so to speak: in some respects the theological equivalent of trying
to write a story about a person whose mode of existence involves a space
with more dimensions than our own. Failure to appreciate the nature of this
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universal creaturely predicament characterizes many criticisms of the doctrine of eternity. For example, like Fitzgerald, Leftow argues that if atemporal
duration does not have the features that characterize spatial and temporal
extension, if it is not the equivalent of a line, then it collapses into the
equivalent of a point. 27 But this inference holds only if it exhausts the possibilities for any mode of existence to describe it either as linelike or as
pointlike, and there is no good reason to think that modes of existence higher
up the ladder of being or of more dimensions than our own are limited in that
way.
Putting the problem in this way suggests a possible way of dealing with it.
Because it is easier to think oneself down, rather than up, the ladder of being,
it may be helpful to tell a story in which eternity is represented by our mode
of existence, and time is represented by a mode of existence lower than ours.
Consider a finite one-dimensional world, Aleph, inhabited by inch-long
intelligent beings arrayed sequentially and contiguously in the line-segment
that comprises their world. 28 Any of these Alephians may have many others
in front of or behind him, but only one other inhabitant can be immediately
in front of or behind him. Because Aleph is one-dimensional, no Alephian
can share its place with another. Alephians recognize an absolute here, their
designation for the location of whichever single Alephian happens to have
the mid-point of the line segment within his own length. Alephians come into
existence at the A I end of the line, move slowly and steadily toward here,
where they reach the height of their mental powers, and pass on into deterioration, culminating in their termination at the A2 end. They designate places
between Al and here the hither, places between here and A2 the hence.
Alephians thus have spatial analogues for the A- and B-series in time, but
with this difference, that in Aleph the spatial relationship corresponding to
simultaneity-being-at-the-same-place-as or, in particular, being-herewith-is reflexive only.29
Suppose that Monica, a human being, has all of Aleph horizontally across
her field of vision and is able to interact cognitively and causally with all the
creatures in the line-world. In particular, she has been able to make Nabal, an
Alephian, directly aware of her; he also hears and understands what she says.
"Where are you, Monica?," says Nabal; "Whom are you behind?"
''I'm not behind any of you," says Monica.
"You're not? Then there's no one in front of you. You're at the point of
termination, poor thing."
"Well, no," says Monica; "you're all in front of me."
"You're contradicting yourself," retorts Nabal; "it can't be the case both
that you're behind no one and that everyone is in front of you."
"Well," says Monica hesitantly, "it's hard to explain to you, but I'm not
part of Aleph; I'm not in line at all."
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"Not in line?! Then you must be an isolated point! But that makes no sense;
how could a point say anything?"
Monica tries to explain: ''I'm neither a point nor a line. I'm outside your
world, and the relations that govern your world don't apply to me. In my
mode of existence I can have all of you in front of me without being behind
any of you."
Nabal finds this no help at all: "Just consider what 'behind' and 'in front
of' mean. Unless you're talking sheer nonsense, you must be using those
expressions equivocally. Please tell me, then, what meaning are you giving
those expressions?"
"Well," says Monica, giving it a try, "when I say that you're all in front of
me, I mean that we're all here together."
"Worse and worse! Kindly think before you speak! I am here. Eglon is in
front of me, in the hence; Balak is behind me, in the hither. The hence and
the hither include a\l the places other than here. If, as you say, we are all here
together, Balak and Eglon are both here and not here. Isn't that plainly
incoherent?"
"No, it isn't," Monica hurries to explain, "because 'here' is a relational
term: Eglon and Balak are here with respect to me but not here with respect
to you."
"I knew it would come to this," says Nabal; "now you're denying the
absolute here."
"I'm not," says Monica frustratedly. "I acknowledge that for you in Aleph
there is an absolute here; but for me, in my world, there's a different sort of
here, relating me to all of you in such a way that from my point of view you
Alephians and I are all here together even though in your world you're not
here together."
Nabal retorts: "There couldn't be a here of the sort you claim for yourself,
an extended here that would encompass you and all of us. Only precisely one
thing can be here. The fact that there is a plurality of Alephians requires that
we be ordered in line. When you talk of our all being here together, you are
simply confusing two views. On the one hand, the here cannot be shared. On
the other hand, there can be the sort of extension that accommodates more
than one of us, but only in virtue of our linear ordering, which is just what
precludes there being more than one of us here. The fundamental incoherence
in your thought is the notion that we could all be here together in some
extended here."
Understandably, Nabal cannot envisage Monica's three-dimensional world,
from the standpoint of which it really is the case that she and all the Alephians
are here together, without in any way implying that the relations that obtain
within Nabal's world are illusory or that the Alephians are really three-dimensional. Nabal wants Monica to explain to him the sort of here she's
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talking in, but he wants the explanation only in terms of relations that obtain
in his own world, and he rejects as equivocation her attempts to give him
such an explanation using those terms analogically. The only sort of explanation Nabal would accept is one in which Monica uses terms univocally of
things in her world and in Aleph. But that is just the sort of explanation she
can't give, because the relations that obtain between her mode of existence
and Nabal's are different from any relations that obtain within Aleph.
She could, however, take another tack, offering Nabal an account of beingat-the-same-place-as that would hold between herself and every Alephian,
and introducing it under a neologism- 'being at the MN-same place as' (or
'MNP' for short)-in order to avoid accusations of equivocation. The point
of this exercise would be to show Nabal something of the logic of terms that
relate to her world by defining the nature of the fundamentally relevant
relationship between her world and his. With the aid of MNP, Nabal would
be able to see that some of his attempts to reduce the notion of a three-dimensional world to an absurdity are too facile. But this way of defending the
notion is very different from the futile exercise of explaining Monica's world
to Nabal using only his terms with only the meanings he attaches to them.
Because of the radical difference between their worlds, Monica can't use
Nabal's terms in that way to describe her world. On the other hand, if she
used his terms equivocally, she would still be unable to describe her world
to Nabal unless she could explain to him in univocal language the novel
meanings she was attaching to his terms-something she cannot do. Besides
spelling out the nature of the fundamentally relevant relationship between
her world and his, the best she can do is resort to analogy-from similes to
stories-in an attempt to prompt Nabal's intuitions, stirring him to think
himself up the ladder of being. A more fully satisfying kind of account that
at first seems only reasonable to expect from her turns out to involve the
univocity that is theoretically unattainable in her communication with a being
in a different mode of existence.
These considerations seem to us appropriate and sufficient by way of a
general rejoinder to Nelson's objections and Fitzgerald's first question,30 all
of which consist ultimately in demands that features of eternity be defined
in terms that apply univocally to eternity and time (and perhaps even to
extension universally).

10. Revising the Definition of ET-Simultaneity
As we shall see, the story of Aleph is useful also for suggesting a way of
clarifying the relationship between eternity and time. Although eternity and time
are conceived of as two separate modes of real existence, neither of which is
reducible to the other or to any third thing, they are not conceived of as isolated
from each other. God, an eternal being, is conceived of as omniscient and as
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the creator of everything that is in time, and human beings existing in time
are taken to be able to interact directly with God (in prayer, for example).
But what sort of relationship could obtain between beings whose modes of
existence are as disparate as time and eternity? Because eternity is timeless,
nothing can be earlier or later than, or past or future with respect to anything
else, either within eternity itself or in case one of the relata is eternal and the
other temporal. But since eternity is also characterized as (conscious, active)
life, presentness must be a feature of eternity. And if what is eternal is to be
related cognitively or causally to anything temporal, the relationship must be
characterized by simultaneity, which, unlike priority and posteriority, is not
ruled out by timelessness.
Of course, if simultaneity must be understood as occurrence or existence
at the same tillie, then clearly the concept of eternal-temporal relationships
is incoherent, and nothing eternal can be simultaneous with anything else,
eternal or temporal. In "Eternity" we dealt with this difficulty by defining a
species of simultaneity that would hold between eternal and temporal entities
or events. Since simultaneity may be thought of generically as co-existence
or co-occurrence, it might be supposed that at any rate temporal simultaneity
can be spelled out as co-existence or co-occurrence at the same time. Considerations of relativity, however, require that simultaneity be relativized to
reference frames, so that a more precise formulation of temporal simultaneity
would develop along these lines: co-occurrence or co-existence at the same
time within a particular reference frame. Generalizing this approach to relations between time and eternity, we formulated a simultaneity relationship
between eternity and time (ET-simultaneity):
(ET)

For every x and y (where x and y range over entities and events), x
and yare ET-simultaneous iff
(i)

either x is eternal and y is temporal, or vice versa; and

(ii)

for some observer, A, in the unique eternal reference frame, x
and yare both present-i.e., either x is eternally present and y
is observed as temporally present, or vice versa; and

(iii)

for some observer, B, in one of the infinitely many temporal
reference frames, x and yare both present-Le., either x is observed as eternally present and y is temporally present, or vice
versa.

It should be noticed that ET-simultaneity is symmetric but (unlike temporal
simultaneity) neither reflexive nor transitive. 3l The formulation of ET-simultaneity in terms of observers should not mislead anyone. By 'observer' here
we mean only that thing, animate or inanimate, with respect to which the
reference frame is picked out and with respect to which the simultaneity of
events within the reference frame is determined. 32
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Some aspects of ET-simultaneity may be more intuitively apparent in a
picture that has heuristic value although it is in some ways crude and misleading. Imagine two parallel horizontal lines, the upper one representing
eternity and the lower, time; and let presentness be represented by light. Then
from a temporal viewpoint the temporal present is represented by a dot of
light moving steadily along the lower line, which is in this way lighted
successively, while the eternal present is represented by the upper line's being
entirely lighted at once. So from a temporal viewpoint the temporal present
is ET-simultaneous with the infinite present of an eternal being's life. On the
other hand, from the viewpoint of a being existing in the persisting eternal
present, each temporal instant is ET-simultaneous with the eternal present,
but only insofar as that instant is temporally present, so that from the eternal
being's point of view the entire time line is lighted at once. From an eternal
viewpoint, every present time is present, co-occurrent with the infinite whole
of the eternal present.
What is present to an entity depends on its mode of existence. What is
present to an eternal entity may be present, past, or future to some particular
temporal entity, just as some building may be to the right with respect to one
frame of reference but to the left with respect to another. 33 An eternal entity's
mode of existence is such that its whole life is ET-simultaneous with each
and every temporal entity or event. Any particular temporal event, such as
the opening of the Berlin Wall or the end of apartheid in South Africa is, as
it is occurring, ET-simultaneous with the eternal present. But, relative to us,
given our location on the temporal continuum in early 1993, the first of those
events is past, and the second is future.
This understanding of ET-simultaneity strikes us as sufficient to dispose of
many of the problems that have been raised about the relationship between
eternity and time. But it now seems to us that the definition of ET-simultaneity itself gives rise to a problem.

11. A Problem in the Definition of ET-Simultaneity
William Hasker has recently argued that if the fundamentally relevant metaphysical relationship between an eternal being and temporal beings is correctly portrayed in our definition, then eternal God could not be directly
aware of temporal facts.34 Moreover, God could not be with human beings
directly and immediately, in the way most theists believe he is. The definition
of ET-simultaneity suggests that an eternal God could "observe" human beings as present to him but couldn't actually share their present. In general,
Hasker thinks,
(H) To be directly aware of temporal beings requires being temporal oneself.

Hasker's objection is the mirror-image of one raised by Delmas LewisY
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Lewis argues that if temporal beings are really present to an eternal being,
they must be present in that being's mode of existence-i.e., they must be
eternal. Otherwise, Lewis thinks, they will be only epistemically and not also
metaphysically present to the eternal being. But if time and eternity are
incompatible modes of existence, at least in the sense that what is essentially
temporal cannot also be eternal, then, according to Lewis, the doctrine of
eternity has the unwelcome consequence that temporal beings are only epistemically present to God. Lewis's argument seems to rest on this principle:
(L)

To be metaphysically present to an eternal being, a thing must be
eternal itself.

We are inclined to think that both (H) and (L) are false. (H) appears to
depend on a more general principle:
(GP) x can be directly aware of or epistemically present to y only if x and y
share the same mode of existence;

and (GP) certainly is incompatible with our concept of ET-simultaneity. But
surely neither Hasker nor any traditional theist would be willing to accept
(GP) as applied to space. Since God is traditionally described as non-spatial,
it would follow from (GP) that God cannot be directly aware of spatial beings.
And if traditional theists cannot accept (GP) as applied to space, they cannot
reasonably apply it to time. If God can be directly aware of his creatures
without sharing their spatial mode of existence,36 why should we suppose
that he cannot be directly aware of them without sharing their temporal mode
of existence? (H), therefore, seems false.
And similar considerations weigh against (L). God is traditionally described as omnipresent-i.e., every spatial location is present to him. But
according to (L) the attribute of omnipresence would require either that
spatial locations be non-spatial or that non-spatial God be spatial. If, then,
(L) is false as regards space, why should we accept it as regards time?
We suspect that our definition of ET-simultaneity may perhaps have motivated the sort of objections Lewis and Hasker raise. In it we gloss x's being
present partly in terms of x's being observed as present by "some observer,"
thereby suggesting a gap in presentness that is bridged by no more than
"observation." This way of putting the matter, familiar enough in the context
from which we derived the elements of our definition, appears to be misleading in a theological setting, generating the objection that an eternal God
cannot really be with or directly aware of human beings. So, having called
(H) and (L) into question, we want to revise the definition of ET-simultaneity
in order to alleviate the sort of concern they represent.

12. MNP and ET-Simultaneity
Looking carefully at the relationship between Monica and Nabal in the story
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of Aleph helps to show the way to revise the definition. An attempt at spelling
out the MNP relationship in a form analogous to the definition of ET-simultaneity would look like this:
(MNP)

For every x and every y (where 'x' and 'y' range over entities and
events in the three-dimensional world and in Aleph), x and yare
related by MNP iff
(i)

x is three-dimensional and y is Alephian, or vice versa (for
convenience, let x be three-dimensional and y Alephian); and

(ii)

with respect to a particular three-dimensional entity M, x and y
are both here-i.e., (a) x is three-dimensionally here with respect
to M, (b) y occupies the Alephian here, and (c) both x and yare
situated with respect to M in such a way that M can enter into
direct and immediate causal relations with each of them and (if
capable of awareness) can be directly aware of each of them; and

(iii)

with respect to a particular Alephian entity. N, x and yare
both here-i.e., (a) x is in the three-dimensional referenceframe relative to which y is three-dimensionally present, (b)
y=N, and (c) both x and yare situated with respect to N in
such a way that N can enter into direct and immediate causal
relations with each of them and (if capable of awareness) can
be directly aware of each of them.

Like ET-simultaneity, MNP is symmetric but not reflexive or transitive.
Nabal can be MNP with respect to Monica, but not with respect to himself.
If Eglon is MNP with respect to Monica, and Monica is MNP with respect
to Balak, it won't follow that Eglon is MNP with respect to Balak.
Our notion of the temporal present and our notion of a spatial here are not
completely alike, however. Perhaps the most important difference is that as
it is used in the definition of ET-simultaneity, 'present' is an indexical, indicates a relationship (being-present-to), and refers to the absolute present.
'Here' in MNP does not have the same range. In particular, there is no
three-dimensional spatial analogue to the absolute present.
The second and third conditions in MNP suggest a less misleading way to
formulate the corresponding clauses in a revised definition of ET-simultaneity:
(ET')

For every x and every y, x and yare ET-simultaneous if and only if
(i)

either x is eternal and y is temporal, or vice versa (for convenience, let x be eternal and y temporal); and

(ii)

with respect to some A in the unique eternal reference frame,
x and yare both present-i.e., (a) x is in the eternal present
with respect to A, (b) y is in the temporal present, and (c) both
x and yare situated with respect to A in such a way that A can
enter into direct and immediate causal relations with each of
them and (if capable of awareness) can be directly aware of
each of them; and
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(iii)

with respect to some B in one of the infinitely many temporal
reference frames, x and yare both present-i.e., (a) x is in the
eternal present, (b) y is at the same time as B, and (c) both x
and yare situated with respect to B in such a way that B can
enter into direct and immediate causal relations with each of
them and (if capable of awareness) can be directly aware of
each of them.

This revision of ET-simultaneity, in our view, alleviates the concerns of
both Hasker and Lewis. The clauses specifying direct and immediate causal
relations and direct awareness between what is temporal and what is eternal
imply that an eternal God could have temporal entities as the immediate
objects of his awareness, even though he is eternal and they are not. Those
clauses also imply that temporal entities and events are metaphysically present to God and not just epistemically present. If being metaphysically present
is not entirely captured by these specifications, it is not clear to us what else
is necessary. If anything else should turn out to be necessary, we see no reason
offhand why it could not be added since it strikes us as intuitively clear that
there is nothing in the difference between time and eternity that prevents
metaphysical presence. 37

13. Conclusion
We are painfully aware of difficulties in the concept of eternity.38 We also
think that conceiving of God as the absolutely perfect being entails recognizing that his mode of existence must be eternity rather than time. Theists
committed to conceiving of God in that way are thereby committed to the
struggle to make sense of eternity, of atemporal duration, of a timeless being's
presence in time, knowledge of time, and action in time. Philosophers and
theologians are of course right to be suspicious of a concept whose coherence
is repeatedly challenged, but we hope in this paper to have met some of the
recent challenges of that sort and to have shown that the challenges often
arise out of misunderstanding the doctrine or overlooking the special character of its mode of expression. 39
Eleonore Stump, St. Louis University
Norman Kretzmann, Cornell University
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3. Complete possession and (even more clearly) illimitable life entail duration, and
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4. For discussion of other sorts of criticisms see our "Prophecy, Past Truth, and Eternity"
in James E. Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives, 5 (Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1991), 395-424, where we focus on the use of the doctrine of eternity as a
basis for resolving the problem of divine foreknowledge and human freedom, "the eternity
solution," especially on criticisms of it as involving violations of the principle of the fixity
of the past.
5. The concept of eternity is almost as old as philosophy itself, and its history is not our
concern here. But one criticism of our historical claims in "Eternity" deserves a reply. In
"Time(s), Eternity, and Duration" (International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 22
[1987] 3-19) Herbert Nelson suggests that we are mistaken in including Aquinas among
those who take duration to be part of the concept of eternity, even though Nelson himself
concedes that Aquinas uses the term '''duration' to characterize the existence of a timeless
God" (p. 11). He cites I Sent. d. 8, q. 2, a. I, ad 6 against our view (p. 11, n. 10). Aquinas
does distinguish eternity from duration in that text as well as in other passages in a. 1. But
Nelson has apparently overlooked the parallel between this discussion in Aquinas's early
Sentences commentary and his Sumlna theologiae (ST) Ia q. 10, a. 1, which contains his
more mature views on the same issues. Both texts present six precisely parallel objections
to the claim that the Boethian definition of eternity is correct. But for each passage in the
Sentences commentary that separates eternity and duration, the corresponding passage in
ST unequivocally unites them. For example, although Obj. 2 in each text argues that
existence ought to replace life in the definition, the argument in ST (though not in I Sent.)
is based on a premiss that eternity signifies "a sort of duration," a premiss that Aquinas
leaves unchallenged in his rejoinder to the objection. Again, in both texts Obj. 4 argues
that the phase 'all at once' should not be included in the definition. The objection's
argument in I Sent. depends on the claim that the definition of duration includes having
non-simultaneous parts, a definition that obviously cannot be applied to succession less
eternity. But that part of the argument is omitted from the parallel objection in ST. Finally,
although Obj. 6 in both texts argues against the inclusion of possession in the definition,
the objection's argument in I Se/lt. is based on the claim that eternity has the essential
character (ratio) of duration, a claim that is disputed in the rejoinder to Obj. 6 in I Sent.
But in the parallel passage in ST the claim in the objection that eternity is itself "a sort of
duration" (quaedalll duratio) is tacitly accepted by Aquinas in his rejoinder, which stresses
the absence of change and loss in this mode of existence. So it seems reasonable to infer
that any worries Aquinas may have had at an early stage of his career about attributing
duration to eternity he had abandoned some fourteen years later, when he wrote ST Ia.
For other passages in ST where Aquinas cites and does not dispute the claim that eternity
is a sort of duration, see, e.g., Ia q. 39, a. 8, obj. 1 and reply; q. 46, a. 1, obj. 8, and ad 8.
6. And in "Atemporal Duration: A Reply to Fitzgerald," The Journal of Philosophy 84
(1987),214-219.
7. For more discussion of the intended interpretations of such terms in connection with
the doctrine of eternity, see "Eternity," especially "IV. Atemporal duration and atemporal
life" (pp. 444-47).
8. Of course not every technical use of ordinary terms is analogical. In quantum physics,
for instance, 'charm' and 'color' are used not analogically but equivocally: there is no
respect in which quirks can be construed as charming or colored, and no scintilla of
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elucidation would have been lost if other words had been used equivocally for these
purposes. For more on the analogical use of words, see pp. 467-69 below.
9. "Stump and Kretzmann on Time and Eternity," The Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985),
260-269.
10. Fitzgerald, op. cit., pp. 262 and 263.
11. In "Atemporal Duration" (n. 6 above).
12. In this respect Fitzgerald resembles Locke, who derived the idea of duration from
the idea of succession: "Duration, and Time which is a part of it, is the Idea we have of
perishing distance, of which no two parts exist together, but follow each other in Succession; ... And therefore ... we cannot conceive any Duration without Succession" (Essay II
xv 12). Reid's decisive criticism of Locke on this point might, perhaps, be extended to
Fitzgerald: "let us call the distance between an idea and that which immediately succeeds
it, one element of duration ... If ten such elements make duration, then one must make
duration, otherwise duration must be made up of parts that have no duration, which is
impossible .... Now it must be observed, that in these elements of duration, or single
intervals of successive ideas, there is no succession of ideas, yet we must conceive them
to have duration; whence we may conclude with certainty, that there is a conception of
duration, where there is no succession of ideas in the mind. We may measure duration by
the succession of thoughts in the mind, as we measure length by inches or feet; but the
notion or idea of duration must be antecedent to the mensuration of it, as the notion of
length is antecedent to its being measured" (Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man,
Essay III, Ch. V, p. 351).
13. It may be important in this connection to distinguish between conceptual divisibility
and imaginary divisibility based on conceptual confusion. The sheet of paper on which
these words are printed is conceptually divisible into its right and left halves, and that
conceptualization quite properly gives rise to the concept of the vertical line dividing the
sheet in half. It may be in some sense natural to imagine, further, that that dividing line
has its own right and left sides; but however natural such a thought might be, it would of
course represent a conceptual confusion. Not every division that might actually be carried
out in someone's imagination is evidence of conceptual divisibility.
14. Some philosophers and physicists have, however, argued for extended but indivisible atoms of space or time. See, e.g., Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation and the ColltinuulII
(London: Duckworth, 1983); Norman Kretzmann, "Continua, Indivisibles, and Change in
Wyclif's Logic of Scripture" in A. Kenny, ed., Wyclif in His Times (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1986), pp. 31-65.
15. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 199\. We are grateful to Professor
Leftow for allowing us to see the typescript of his book before publication.
16. Nelson, op. cit. (n. 5 above), p. 16.
17. Nelson, op. cit., p. 12.
18. Nelson, op. cit., p. 16.
19. Nelson, op. cit., e.g., p. 7. Although he introduces his omniscient, omnipotent, freely
creating God as part of a hypothetical example, it is crucial to his example that this
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20. For a still useful discussion of the specious present, see William James, The
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Principles of Psychology I, Ch. XV, "The Perception of Time," esp. pp. 608-lO, "The
Sensible Present Has Duration."
21. The indivisibility of a specious present as such does not preclude subsequent
conceptual divisions of the temporal interval on which it supervened. Cf. James, op. cit.,
p. 610: "We do not first feel one end and then feel the other after it, and from the perception
of the succession infer an interval of time between, but we seem to feel the interval of
time as a whole, with its two ends embedded in it. ... to sensible perception its elements
are inseparable, although attention looking back may easily decompose the experience,
and distinguish its beginning from its end." James here seems to suggest that the specious
present itself may be conceptually divisible in retrospect; our view is that, at least in many
.:ases, only the underlying temporal interval, however short, and not the specious present
itself is divisible in that way.
22. Alston proposes conceiving of God's eternal cognition of temporal events as his
specious present: "the psychological concept of the specious present provides an intelligible model for a nontemporal knowledge of a temporal world .... a being with an infinite
specious present would not, so far as his awareness is concerned, be subject to temporal
succession at all .... Everything would be grasped in one temporally unextended awareness." "Hartshorne and Aquinas: A Via Media," in William P. Alston, Divine Nature and
Human Language (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 136; first
published in J. Cobb and F. Gamwell, eds., Existence and Actuality (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1984).
23. For a good, brief introduction, see James F. Ross, "Analogy as a Rule of Meaning
for Religious Language," InternatiolJal Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1961),468-502 (reprinted in A. Kenny, ed., Aquinas: A CollectiolJ of Critical Essays (Garden City, NY:
Anchor Books-Doubleday & Co., 1969); for a more extended treatment see Ross's
PortrayilJg Analogy.
24. We have in mind similes such as Aquinas's likening of God's eternal knowledge of
time to a mountaintop observer's view of a procession below, arguments such as Paley's
about the watch and the universe or the standard argument for the existence of other minds,
and theories such as those in ancient and medieval philosophy that depend on the
microcosm-macrocosm analogy.
25. Nelson, op. cit., p. 4.
26. "In some ways the Stump-Kretzmann notion of atemporal duration resembles my
own notion of Beta-a universe temporally unrelated to our own," op. cit., p. 17.
27. Leftow, op. cit., ch. V, sect. 5.
28. Cf. the "Lineland" of A. Square's dream in Edwin A. Abbott's Flatland (1884; New
York: New American Library, 1984), Chs. 13 & 14.
29. Of course there is time in Aleph, and there are temporal as well as spatial relationships; but we are interested only in its spatial characteristics.
30. See p. 466 above.
31. Cf. "Eternity," 439-440.
32. "Eternity," p. 438, n. 15.
33. This way of looking at eternity and time need not conflict with the idea that there
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is an absolute temporal present, that temporal passage is real rather than mind-dependent.
One frame of reference in respect of which to detennine presentness might be all of time
itself.
34. "One can be immediately aware only of what is present for one to be aware of; what
else, after all, can 'immediate' mean? If God is timeless, he can be immediately aware of
(supposedly) temporal facts only if these facts really are timeless after all. If, on the other
hand, the world really is temporal, only a temporal God can be immediately aware of
it-and then only of its present, not of its past or future," p. 169 in William Hasker, God,
Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989).
35. "Eternity, Time and Tenselessness," Faith and Philosophy 5 (1988), 72-86.
36. Consider relationships of direct awareness in which the subject and object are of
different orders of dimensionality. A three-dimensional observer can be and very frequently is effortlessly aware of a two-dimensional object as such; an imagined two-dimensional observer could not be aware of a three-dimensional object as three-dimensional.
(Cf. the experiences of A. Square in Abbott's Flatlalld, n. 28 above.)
37. Someone might object to clause (c) in conditions (ii) and (iii) of (ET') along the
lines of Nelson's objection to our original fonnulation of these conditions: "That God
observes temporal things as temporally present is a condition of... ET-simultaneity .... It
is logically impossible for this condition to be satisfied by a timeless God. If God is
timeless, whether something is temporally present is a pseudo-question for God" (op. cit.,
p. 18, n. 4). Unlike Hasker, Nelson is apparently taking 'observes' to indicate a state of
direct awareness, and he is presumably assuming that a timeless God cannot have direct
awareness of things in time. Nelson does not spell out his reasons for his claim that it is
logically impossible for a timeless God to have direct awareness of temporal things. But
the only grounds we know of for a claim of this sort is are those supplied by Hasker and
Lewis. Similarly, any attempt to object to the corresponding clauses in (ET') by arguing
that it is impossible for an eternal God to have direct and immediate causal relations with
or direct awareness of temporal things seems to us to rely on arguments like those of
Hasker and Lewis. Since we have already argued against the principles on which those
arguments are based, we are inclined to think that the relevant clauses of (ET') are immune
to this sort of objection.
38. "The doctrine that God is timeless turns out, when properly understood, to be a very
strange doctrine indeed. The problem with deviant versions of the theory is not that they
are strange, but that they are not strange enough to have a chance of being true." William
Hasker,op. cit., p. 146.
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